Multidimensional and equivocal : the theoretical and philosophical issues of legal sanctions by Pęksa, Władysław & Kociołek-Pęksa, Anna
Multidimensional and Equivocal: 
the Theoretical and Philosophical 
Issues of Legal Sanctions
Anna Kociołek-Pęksa
Department of Law, Faculty of Civil Safety Engineering, 
Main School of Fire Service in Warsaw
apeksa@sgsp.edu.pl
Władysław Pęksa
Jagiellonian University, Chair of Polish Legal 
History, Faculty of Law and Administration
wladyslaw.peksa@uj.edu.pl
KOCIOŁEK-PĘKSA, Anna; PĘKSA, Władysław. Multidimensional and Equivo-
cal: the Theoretical and Philosophical Issues of Legal Sanctions. International 
and Comparative Law Review, 2017, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 73–92. DOI 10.2478/iclr-
2018-0016.
Summary: The social order, and especially the legal order, is implemented and main-
tained by institutions whose actions are based on the application of various forms of 
legal constraint. A sanction in the law may take various forms, as diversified in content 
may be the legislative justifications for them. The article deals with reflection on sanc-
tions. It begins with a linguistic note: “sanction” as a semantic category and a term from 
juristic language. Then in the theory of law as an element of the structure of the norm. 
Authors also point out that sanctions exist in normative systems other than the law and 
they start reasoning by citing the view that the most important goal of establishing sanc-
tions is to prompt adequate motivation of the subjects to comply with the norm (legal 
or other). In the essential part of the article the authors refer the division and typology 
of sanctions and theirs construction. In the final and most important part of the article 
the classical point of view - quoted at the beginning - is confronted with the order of 
international law, which is sometimes recognized as as lex imperfecta – as the interna-
tional public law (law of nations) hasn’t developed a system of institutionalized sanctions 
ensuring observance of its norms. The authors suggest that it is a mistake committed 
the most frequently by lawyers not expert in international public law unjustifiably and 
incorrectly transfer the apparatus of notions with precisely assigned significance straight 
from the theory of domestic (in this case, Polish) law into the sphere of research on 
public international law. For the international law is shaped as a decentralized structure, 
within which the question of the execution of behaviours complying with its principles 
and rules belong to the duties of the subjects of that law—members of international 
society. The effectiveness, efficiency and purposefulness of the law is not completely 
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nor exclusively conditioned by the existence and type of legal constraint and the inter-
national law has not been deprived of the attribute of law. The only real thing is only 
that a sanction has not always been automatically and immediately applied in case of 
infringement of a  legal duty, since launching a  sanction may require a  specific legal 
action on behalf of another entitled subject of international law.
Keywords: Legal sanction, lex imperfectae, normativism, regulatory influence of the 
legal norm, three-part structure of the legal norm, imperfect norm, coupled norms, 
sanctioned norm, sanctioning norm, legal constraint, effectiveness of the law, efficiency 
of the law, reinforcement/weakening of the regulative impact.
“Science attempts to produce one, the most logically unified legal system, even 
if the normative facts themselves were opposed to it; it attempts to fill in the gaps in 
the system, to remove contradictions, in one word, to perform this “digging at the 
rotten tree” – and all of it to make the pattern of due behaviour given to people, to 
be unified and monopolistic”, 
LANDE, Jerzy. Studia z filozofii prawa, 
Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959, p.425.
1 Introduction.
In the contemporary international community, among societies, and in other 
politically organised collectives that cannot be narrowed down only to states—if 
only because of the existence of such objects as international organisations—the 
social order, and especially the legal order, is implemented and maintained by 
institutions whose actions are based on the application of various forms of legal 
constraint. In the research on legal sanctions in legal orders, the departure point 
will be the conviction that the comprehension of legal norms as a certain enun-
ciation of accompanying psycho-social situations (sanctions) allows for theo-
retical research1. A sanction in the law may take various forms, as diversified in 
content may be the legislative justifications for them2. This is why examination 
of the problem of sanctions is not, as it may seem prima facie, simple nor unidi-
mensional. 
This reflection on sanctions3 should begin with a  linguistic note. In Latin, 
the word for “sanction”—in its meaning defined as juridical—signifies a conse-
1 See: OPAŁEK, Kazimierz. Z zagadnień teorii prawa i teorii nauki Leona Petrażyckiego: stu-
dia opracowane dla upamiętnienia stulecia urodzin. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe,1969, p. 54.
2 The same opinion is shared by: SEIDLER, Grzegorz, GROSZYK, Henryk, PIENIĄŻEK, 
Antoni. Wprowadzenie do  nauki o  państwie i  prawie. LUBLIN: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 
2003, p. 128. 
3 In the dictionary Słownik socjologii i nauk społecznych, we can find a joined definition of 
“sanction” and “social sanction”, which should be understood as “every mean supporting 
the conformism towards socially acclaimed standards. Sanctions can be positive (when 
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quence of infringing the law. It needs to be noted here that the term “sanction” is 
used in the professional literature to designate the consequence of infringing not 
only legal norms but also other social norms, both in the state space and within 
the international community 4. “Sanction” as a semantic category is a term from 
juristic language while in the theory of law, that is, at the highest rank of theoreti-
cal generalization, a legal sanction is treated as a separate norm or as an element 
of its structure5.
Legal sanctions (both negative and positive) and non-legislative sanctions 
existing in normative systems other than the law (such as social subsystems) 
operate in a formalized manner in the case of the law, or in a non-formalized 
way in other normative systems, as they are intentionally treated as a tool of legal 
control and social control. According to Andrzej Kojder, “in every society, there 
is a more or less sophisticated system of control over the behaviour of individu-
als and collectives that is composed of a sum of different manners of supervi-
sion and regulation of human behaviour in situations acclaimed to be socially 
important”6. For that very reason, we consider in our research that sanctions 
comprise one of the most important indicators (motivating factors: behavioural 
and finite) of the effective conduct/behaviours of individuals, social groups, soci-
eties and politically organised collectives and are justified both in a cognitive as 
well as a social and juristic-pragmatic dimension. 
2 The idea of legal sanction in the structure of legal system.
A legal sanction is purely external; it relies on the credibility of the external 
authority to use force to impose submission to the law7. A sanction treated as 
rewarding a behaviour complying with the general expectations) or negative (when penal-
izing various forms of behaviour drifting away from the norm), as well as formal (as in legal 
sanctions) or informal (as in hurling insults). The last type of sanction is sometimes called 
‘informal social control’”, MARSHALL, Gordon, TABIN, Marek (eds.). Słownik socjologii 
i nauk społecznych. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2008, pp. 299–300.
4 About basic sense of sanction see in GARNER, Bryan (ed.). Black’s Law Dictionary. Ninth 
edition. United States: WEST A Thomson Reuters business, 2009, pp.1458–59. Moreover 
see in polish literature: DZIEDZIAK, Wojciech. Sankcje prawne. In SOKÓŁ, Wojciech, 
DZIEMIDOK-OLSZEWSKA, Bożena. Encyklopedia politologii. Vol. 2 Instytucje i systemy 
polityczne. Warszawa: Oficyna a  Wolters Kluwer business, 2012, pp. 357–359. See also 
CESARZ, Zbigniew. Sankcje międzynarodowe. In ŁOŚ-NOWAK, Teresa, FLORCZAK, 
Agnieszka (eds.). Encyklopedia politologii. Tom V  Stosunki Międzynarodowe. Warszawa: 
Oficyna Wolters Kluwer business, 2010, s. 537–539.
5 GRYNIUK, Anna. Sankcja prawna a  prawny przymus. In SKĄPSKA, Grażyna, CZAP-
SKA, Janina, DANIEL, Krystyna, GÓRSKI, Jakub, PAŁECKI, Krzysztof (eds.). Prawo w 
zmieniającym się społeczeństwie. Księga Jubileuszowa Profesor Marii Boruckiej–Arctowej. 
Kraków: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek i Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1992, p. 93. 
6 KOJDER, Andrzej. Godność i siła prawa. Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 2001, p. 307.
7 Such an understanding of “sanction” was in use at least from J. Bentham’s times. For more, 
see: DUTKIEWICZ, Paweł. Powinności i  sankcje. In Etyka zarys. Kraków: Uniwersytet 
Jagielloński. Instytut Filozofii. Zakład Etyki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 
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repression serves to maintain the social order in the same way and on the same 
basis as normative systems in their task to guarantee a  given social and legal 
order8. The problem with using repression in contemporary democratic socie-
ties, especially when it comes to justifying the punitory right, is quite controver-
sial in the judicial and philosophical literature9. Legal norms distinguish them-
selves through the element of constraint (sanction), which, as noted by Jerzy 
Wróblewski, according to normativism is included in the content of the norm 
and not to the sphere of facts. This means the law and state apparatus of con-
straint have nothing in common from a normativism point of view10. The main 
function of normativism is to implement standards independent of individual 
convictions and which are the grounds for the right to order, prohibit or author-
ize11. The very sanctions established by a  legislature (sanctions as a normative 
concept) don’t by themselves enforce the effectiveness of legal norms as legal 
sanctions constitute only one factor influencing the effectiveness of the law12. 
Zygmunt Ziembiński claimed that in order to shape the conduct of an addressee 
of the law regarding a standard of due behaviour comprised in the disposition of 
a legal norm (that is, the addressee will decide to observe the legal norm when 
properly informed) and by doing so to avoid the negative effects described in the 
sanction of the legal norm, it is necessary for the addressee to endorse the con-
tent of the norm or to be afraid of the sanction threat if trespassing the norm, or 
for the conduct prescribed by the norm to become the addressee’s habit13—ide-
ally the standard of due conduct should be internalized in the process of norma-
tive socialization. Thus, the psycho-sociological element, that is, legal awareness 
of the law’s addressees, determines (however, not automatically nor exclusively) 
the range and means of implementing a  legal sanction without making a dis-
tinction between an understanding of the very sanction as linguistic enuncia-
tion or as experience (a type of ethical emotion), or as a sovereign’s or any other 
authority’s  order. Besides, within the above-mentioned range of the study on 
the function and role of a sanction, on the notion of “sanction” as a component 
of a legal norm, four definitions of legal norms may be referred, as indicated by 
Jerzy Wróblewski: 1) judgment about duty, 2) the will of the state, 3) semantic 
outline, and 4) evaluation14. Evidently, the outcome will be identical with the 
w Krakowie, 1992, p. 27.
8 See: GRZYBOWSKI, Stefan. Dzieje prawa. Opowieść, refleksje, rozważania. Wrocław-
Warszawa-Kraków: Wydawnictwo Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich,1981, p. 221.
9 See: DUFF, Antony. Karanie obywateli. “Ius et Lex” 2006, No. 1, p. 21 and following. 
10 WRÓBLEWSKI, Jerzy. Krytyka normatywistycznej teorii prawa i państwa Hansa Kelsena. 
Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1955, pp.148–149.
11 BROŻEK, Bartosz, BROŻEK, Anna, STELMACH, Jerzy. Fenomen normatywności. 
Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 2013, p. 21. 
12 See: DZIEDZIAK, Wojciech. Wpływ sankcji prawnych i moralnych na skuteczność prawa. 
„Studia Iuridica Lublinensia” Vol. XXIV, 1, 2015, pp. 67 and 72. 
13 ZIEMBIŃSKI, Zygmunt. Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa. Warszawa: Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe,1980, p. 423.
14 WRÓBLEWSKI, Jerzy. Krytyka normatywistycznej teorii prawa…, op.cit.,p.133.
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above, that is, it will not influence the fact of the direct and indirect—clearly, 
on a limited scale—impact (in the sense of indicating and determining) on the 
volitional, motivational and decisive processes of the addressees of the law in the 
context of fulfilling or neglecting the legal duties. We assume, then, that legal 
awareness of the law’s addressees within the existence of a sanction constitutes 
an extra guarantee for ensuring the observance of the otherwise binding norm, 
as the sanction is only an additional element (one of three), not the only one, and 
not even the strongest or most efficient among the guarantees of effectiveness of 
the observance of a binding law15. 
An essential goal of establishing sanctions is to prompt adequate motiva-
tion of the subjects to comply with the legal norm16. Of this opinion is Andrzej 
Kojder, who believes that by means of legal sanctions it is possible to influence, 
in a rather effective, purposeful and planned manner, individual and collective 
behaviours; he also affirms that the creation and application of the law makes it 
possible to affect public opinion in a way that motivates observation of the law 
17. Thanks to that, it is possible to effect the addressees’ factual choices in their 
observance of the law and their fulfilment of the goals of the legal regulation 
assumed by the legislature, which is particularly important due to the key18 role 
of the law in the accomplishment of fundamental social goals. 
It is indicated19 in the philosophy of law and the philosophy of politics that 
theoretical justification, or social legitimization for the right of punishment 
would be a concept, defined by Ronald Dworkin, as an imaginary assembly that 
is an epiphenomenon of the theory of the social contract, according to which 
individuals assume obligations and submit themselves to the right of punish-
ment limiting their individual freedom20. The law’s addressees are little aware of 
the fact that by accepting to receive sanctions, including the use of repression, 
they de facto adopt the view that a  sanction is an expression of constraint as 
15 Similar: IZDEBSKI, Zygmunt. Teoria państwa i  prawa. Warszawa: Akademia Teologii 
Katolickiej, 1975, p. 174.
16 Statement formulated already in the 1970s, during the previous legal and political system 
in Poland, by Zygmunt Izdebski. Same author: Teoria państwa i prawa. op.cit, p. 74. 
17 KOJDER, Andrzej. Godność i siła prawa. op.cit., p. 309. 
18 Representatives of the current of economic analysis of the law R. Cooter R. and T. Ulen 
draw our attention to this aspect of the law, pointing to the fact that the economy as a social 
science brings into the legal science extremely useful normative standards that facilitate 
the valuation of both the law and the effectiveness of political activity. See: COOTER, 
Roger, ULEN, Thomas. Law and Economics. Pearson Addison Wesley, Boston−San Fran-
cisco−New York−London−Toronto−Sydney−Tokyo−Singapore−Madrid−Mexico City−
Munich−Paris−Cape Town−Hong Kong−Montreal 2008, pp. 3–5).
19 For example, see: PENO, Michał. Filozoficzne podstawy karania—uzasadnienie istnienia 
kary we współczesnych społeczeństwach demokratycznych. In: NAWROT, Oktawian, SYKU-
NA, Sebastian, ZAJADŁO, Jerzy (eds.). Konwergencja czy dywergencja kultur i systemów 
prawnych. Warszawa Wydawnictwo CH Beck, 2012, pp. 243–250. 
20 DWORKIN, Ronald. Biorąc prawa poważnie. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Nau-
kowe, 1998, p. 277.
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a constitutive feature of the law, thus acceptance of the law extends automati-
cally on acceptance of the use of sanctions. It derives, among others, from the 
fact that while faced with a dilemma about a choice of legally relevant conduct 
(action, non-action or abandonment), the law’s  addressee (an actor in public 
international law), by his seemingly neutral axiological decision as to whether to 
comply with the standard of proscribed behaviour formulated by the disposition 
of the legal norm, is in reality faced with a decision about the choice of axiology 
to follow, if the axiological ground of the legal norm addressing him is not com-
patible with his preferred scale of values. “The addressee may not oppose that if 
he considers those orders and interdictions to be justified in the light of his own 
convictions (justification of the axiology is autonomous) or if he is unclear about 
the way of conduct to adopt and the legislator by indicating the defined conduct 
liberates him from nagging doubts by imposing specific values (justification of 
the axiology is heteronomous)”21. 
However, although a sanction as a psycho-social matter is generally defined 
by legal provisions and in the practice of applying the law, a lawyer is interested 
in “sanction”, according to Kazimierz Opałek, not as a psycho-social matter but 
as a linguistic fact22. One cannot, however, examine sanctions correctly without 
taking into account the evidence underlined by Czesław Znamierowski that it is 
most frequently a situation of constraint: the legal norm’s addressee has found 
himself in a legally relevant situation and in front of a choice of behaviour that 
would lead to future consequences, all of which he considers to be disadvanta-
geous, that is, before the choice of a lesser evil23. A legal sanction is institutional-
ized, which means that its application takes place through institutionalized con-
straint—one reserved exclusively for the state/subject of international law. This 
is partly the reason why for sociologists and psychologists who deal with law, but 
also for some theoreticians, a legal sanction does not constitute solely a linguistic 
fact/dimension. Anna Gryniuk unequivocally states that legal constraint is a real 
phenomenon (psychosocial)24. Hence, the majority of the theoretical research 
on legal sanctions is insufficient as it has been conducted by theoreticians and 
philosophers within the philosophy of the language and theory of law, uncon-
21 REDELBACH, Andrzej, WRONKOWSKA, Sławomira, ZIEMBIŃSKI, Zygmunt. Zarys 
teorii państwa i prawa. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1994, p. 90.
22 See: OPAŁEK, Kazimierz. Z zagadnień teorii prawa i teorii nauki Leona Petrażyckiego: stu-
dia opracowane dla upamiętnienia stulecia urodzin. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe, 1969, p. 52.
23 See: ZNAMIEROWSKI, Czesław. Podstawowe pojęcia teorii prawa, cz I  Układ prawny 
i norma prawna. Poznań 1934, p. 61 and following. Moreover see also CZEPITA, Stanisław. 
Konstrukcje teoretycznoprawne Czesława Znamierowskiego. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Nau-
kowe Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza, 1988.
24 GRYNIUK, Anna. Sankcja prawna a  prawny przymus. In SKĄPSKA, Grażyna, CZAP-
SKA, Janina, DANIEL, Krystyna, GÓRSKI, Jakub, PAŁECKI, Krzysztof (eds.). Prawo w 
zmieniającym się społeczeństwie…, op.cit., 1992, p. 93. For more, see by the same author: 
Przymus prawny: studium socjologiczno-prawne. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, 1994.
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nected to sociologists and social psychologists; their flaw consists of them being 
multidisciplinary instead of interdisciplinary. 
In the theory of law, the interdependence between sanctions and legal duties 
is exposed, which underlines and excessively displays negative sanctions as an 
annoyance put in the form of an institutionalized constraint in case of the lack 
of or improper fulfilment of a  legal duty. Only a  few authors point to a  sanc-
tion as being “a warranty for something that isn’t necessarily an infringement 
of duty”25, thus a sanction as the consequence of an addressee’s behaviour may 
be a positive sanction, such as a reward for proper, correct and timely accom-
plishment of a legal obligation; at the same time, in this context, the existence of 
norms formulating duties but deprived of sanctions is not excluded (more on the 
topic further in the text). The dichotomist and disjunctive division of sanctions 
to positive ones and negative ones bears the effect of the sanction being under-
stood as a reward or punishment, which modifies the definition of an ordered or 
forbidden behaviour prescribed in the norm. If, however, we extend the field of 
study of sanctions to normative systems other than the law, but which also oper-
ate with sanctions (social sanctions) even though not institutionalized (concen-
trated), rather dispersed, we notice that in various normative systems (such as 
religious, moral, customary, ethical, cultural ones) the coexistence of sanctions 
seen as penalties and rewards, enables the simultaneous functioning of mutually 
contradictory norms 26; with the exception of the system of legal norms, where 
one of the contradictory norms would have to be derogated. Nevertheless, in 
reference to relations between particular normative systems, a norm of a system 
A norm from system A may remain in contradiction with a norm of system B, 
both in its disposition and sanction (the same behaviour may be ordered and 
rewarded within one system while simultaneously prohibited and penalized in 
another), and thus, execution of the sanction within one normative order may be 
authorization (i.e., within a legal system) while within another normative system 
it will be an order (i.e., religion). The author of the so-called “pure theory” of 
law27, Hans Kelsen, formulated a standpoint that goes even further: he assumed 
that even within the same normative system, it is possible to legitimize the func-
tioning of contradictory behaviours28, obviously with the reservation that the 
25 FILIPEK, Józef. Sankcja prawna w prawie administracyjnym. „Państwo i Prawo” No. 12, 
1963, pp. 873–880.
26 For more, see: GREEN, Michael Steven. Hans Kelsen and the logic of legal systems. “Ala-
bama Law Review” Vol. 53 No. 2, 2003, pp. 365–413. 
27 It is worthwhile to mention that the “pure theory of law” by Hans Kelsen, in its aspect 
of the possible explanation of the law as a product of human activity, was undermined 
by, among others, Jerzy Wróblewski. He claims that “the pure theory of Kelsen not only 
doesn’t explain the state and the law as a product of human activity, but doesn’t even for-
mulate this thesis clearly, and what is more, according to its methodology, it cannot formu-
late it”. See: WRÓBLEWSKI, Jerzy, Krytyka normatywistycznej…,op.cit., p. 227.
28 See: KELSEN, Hans. Pure Theory of Law. Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1970, p. 25.
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dispositions of the contradictory norms (norm A  foreseeing outcome X, and 
norm B foreseeing an outcome other than X) cannot be accomplished by the 
same addressee at the same time, as the order and interdiction concerning the 
same object cannot be attained by the same behaviour. Kelsen himself considers 
various aspects of the law as a tool to enforce by the means of sanctions operating 
on constraint the behaviour desired by the legislature, both on an individual and 
social level, only to conclude that if the law cannot be anything else but an order 
of external constraint, it has to be seen as a specific technique of social organiza-
tion. Kelsen’s opinion on this is criticized by Jerzy Wróblewski, who reproaches 
him that such a construct, having as its purpose “purity” of the theory of law, 
leads in reality to a situation in which “law as social technique becomes a goal 
in itself ” 29. 
3 The legal sociology view on the idea of legal sanctions
The wider consequences of the simultaneous coexistence of not-always-
coherent nor reconcilable, legal and extra-legal regulations (norms) of the 
same fragments of the social reality (including the legal reality), operating with 
sanctions proper for the normative systems (within which they were created/ 
shaped), are the consequences of the motivation of the addressees of the norms 
to the correct behaviours. The question is, which of the simultaneously exist-
ing normative standards of due conduct will be chosen and carried out. In this 
field, Krzysztof Pałecki, based on his empiric research30, distinguished four reac-
tions of addressees to situations where legal and extra-legal normative regula-
tion appear simultaneously (in parallel). “The first of them could be described as 
a mono-normative determination. It consists of the fact that members of a given 
collective follow only one type of norms (bold in original text) while ignor-
ing all the other types of normative regulations, as well as all the other norms 
regulating the matter in question (…) The second type of reactions would be 
called dispersion of regulatory influences. It consists of a sort of “division” of 
a unified matter, regulated in parallel by various types of norms, made by the 
members of a given collective, into two or more independent, as far as influence 
on the addressees’ conduct is concerned, “spheres of impact” (determination). 
In each of these “spheres”, addressees are guided by different norms without 
consideration to other regulations. (…) The third type of social reaction will be 
described as reinforcement of regulatory impact of the law and/or extra-legal 
social norms. It consists of the addressees guided only by provisions of one type 
of norm (i.e., legal norms), while referring to the similar—objectively or solely 
in their view—regulations comprised in other norms in order to have an addi-
29 WRÓBLEWSKI, Jerzy. Krytyka..., op.cit.,p. 140.
30 The author cites research in the field of family law, published in 1978. See: PAŁECKI, 
Krzysztof, Społeczne opinie o  prawie i  jego sądowym stosowaniu w dziedzinie stosunków 
rodzinnych. In BORUCKA–ARCTOWA, Maria. Poglądy społeczeństwa polskiego na stoso-
wanie prawa. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1978. 
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tional argument to justify the obligation to observe the first norms (fortifying 
the motivation to obey them). It often happens in the cases regulated by norms 
belonging to the core of the normative system in the given society. (…) Lastly, 
the fourth type of reaction to the simultaneous legal and extra-legal regulation 
of the same matters can be described as weakening of the regulatory impact. In 
short, it consists of the non-observance of certain norms (legal, extra-legal) or 
the motivation to obey them being weakened for the reason of confusion experi-
enced by their addressees who were convinced of the contrary regulation set by 
other norms on the same matter. Obviously, this conviction may be more or less 
false, but still it can affect negatively the eagerness to obey the norms as the duty 
has been ‘weakened’”31. A consequence of the occurrence of various social norms 
in parallel is obviously similar to the occurrence of sanctions based on which 
some of the addressees of the norm make decisions as to the choice of optimal 
(from a subjective point of view) conduct that would lead them in possibly the 
most effective and efficient manner to the fulfilment of selected values-goals. 
It’s important to note, however, that the type of sanctions that would determine 
those decisions to the highest degree (concentrated sanction or one of the dis-
persed sanction) depends on a norm from a given normative order/system from 
which the sanction internalized by the addressee32 derives, and it will be in ref-
erence to the axiological fundament of that norm (or defined value) that the 
process of axiological association will proceed33. The assessment procedure plays 
an essential (rudimentary) part in decision-making processes about the choice 
of norms of conduct and outline the factual way for their fulfilment, based on 
the criterion of the value protected by the given norm and the sanction aimed at 
ensuring the achievement and multiplication of the very value, that is, the sanc-
tion as indicator of the finite effectiveness of the norm.
31 PAŁECKI, Krzysztof. Prawoznawstwo zarys wykładu. Prawo w porządku społecznym. War-
szawa: Wydawnictwo Difin, 2003, pp. 182–185. 
32 Internalization of the norms is a process of transformation of the heteronomous norms into 
autonomous norms in the normative awareness of the norm’s addressees. See: PAŁECKI, 
Krzysztof, Prawoznawstwo zarys wykładu…, p. 69. See also: ZIEMBIŃSKI, Zygmunt. 
Wstęp do aksjologii dla prawników. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze,1990, p. 243 and 
following. 
33 The process of the axiology of association “consists of a  gradual coordination (confor-
mation) of the individual axiology of preferences (bold in original text) of an individ-
ual hierarchy of values of a person with values determining the regulatory content of the 
norms; norms imposed on a  person in the normative socialization process, from ‘out-
side’. It allows acceptance of certain of these norms, at first ‘external’ (environmental) for 
one’s own ‘internal’ norms. This process is not identical to internalisation of the norms”. 
PAŁECKI, Krzysztof. Prawoznawstwo zarys wykładu….,op. cit., p. 67. 
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4 Types of sanctions and constructions and concepts of a legal norm
 The most widespread and, at the same time, fundamental division of sanc-
tions is into three types: repressive sanction (to execute punishment34 against 
one liable for infringement of a law), executive sanction35 (applied when achieve-
ment of the expected state is still attainable despite infringement of the law), 
and nullity sanction (to recognize as null from a legal point of view actions that 
were aimed at achieving an effect but which, because of the incompatibility of 
the actions with the obligatory legal requirements, do not result in the intended 
effects)36. Also generally accepted is the division of legal norms regarding sanc-
tions on the infringement of dispositions of the norm, considering the crite-
rion of a mutual link between a repressive and executive sanction. As a result of 
applying such a criterion, we obtain the following distinction: if infringement of 
the disposition of a repressive or nullity sanction is foreseen, we have to do with 
so-called leges plus quam perfectae; leges perfectae, by contrast, foresees exclu-
sively annulment of an action non-conforming with the law while leges minus 
quam perfectae anticipates only a penalty without anticipating annulment; leges 
imperfectae, lastly, does not foresee sanctions, nullity nor a penalty for infringe-
ment of the disposition37. This seemingly obvious division is intrinsically related 
to the problem of the construction of the norm itself and the role that the sanc-
tion plays in it. 
34 Some authors formulate the opinion that there is no need to justify or legitimise the use of 
repressive sanctions, especially penal ones. For example, in the textbook of penal law by 
Julliusz Makarewicz we find the conviction/statement that all the penal theories attempt-
ing to justify their penalties seem obviously erroneous, as the penalty does not require 
justification—unlike the crime, which is a social fact that can at the most be explained, 
MAKAREWICZ, Juliusz. Prawo karne ogólne. Lwów 1914, p. 27.
35 “Executive sanction” is sometimes called “restoring sanction” (from Latin: restitutio, or 
return to the previous sate). See: CHAUVIN, Tatiana, STAWECKI, Tomasz, WINCZOREK, 
P. Wstęp do prawoznawstwa. Warszawa Wydawnictwo CH Beck, 2014, p. 115.
36 See: BORUCKA–ARCTOWA, Maria, WOLEŃSKI, Jan. Wstęp do  prawoznawstwa. 
Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego w Krakowie, 1998. pp  76–77. In 
reference to the nullity sanction, i.e., in the dogma of civil law, we encounter an argu-
ment in favour of the very careful formulation and application of a sanction, as Stanisław 
Sołtysiński and Andrzej Szlęzak say. Zbigniew Radwański, while analysing the range of the 
application of Art. 58 of the Polish civil code, postulated reaching for the nullity sanction 
prudently and he stressed that the “law” comprises all the legal provisions in force together 
with local law and EU law, excluding from the content of the notion of the law such legal 
acts as statutes passed by companies, cooperative organisations and other legal persons. 
Using the concept of conventional actions, he urged limiting the faultiness of the legal 
action and its absolute nullity when he also agreed with the statement that legal norms 
comprised in civil code but also in the code of commercial companies, don’t offer the bases 
to distinguish the null actions from “non-existing” actions. See: SOŁTYSIŃSKI, Stanisław, 
SZLĘZAK, Andrzej. Profesor dr Zbigniew Radwański (1924–2012). „Studia Prawa Prywat-
nego” No. 7 (annual), Vol. 1(28) 2013, p. 5. 
37 For more, see: CHAUVIN, Tatiana, STAWECKI, Tomasz, WINCZOREK, Piotr. Wstęp 
do prawoznawstwa…op.cit. , pp. 118–119.
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That issue of the construction of the legal norm is crucial in our opinion, since 
not every legal norm, even those whose dispositions impose on the addressee of 
the law a  necessity to accomplish a  legal duty, comprises an element of sanc-
tion. The concepts of the construction of the legal norm that appears in the Pol-
ish literature on the matter have, respectively, a two- and three-part structure of 
a legal norm. There is also the concept of coupled norms38. Among the two-part 
concepts, two models of a  legal norm are distinguished: the first, encompass-
ing the hypothesis and disposition (H®D), the second, composed of hypothesis 
and sanction (H®S). A two-part norm in the setting Hypothesis®Disposition, sets 
out a situation in which, in the circumstances described in the hypothesis, the 
addressee of the norm should behave in a way compliant with the description 
comprised in the disposition of the norm. According to the second type of two-
part norm, this time in the setting Hypothesis®Sanction, in the circumstances 
described in the hypothesis, the proper organ of the state should impose on the 
addressee of the law defined in the hypothesis the given sanction. 
Generations of lawyers were taught, however, that a norm is composed of 
three elements—hypothesis, disposition and sanction—and they were taught 
that because, as slightly ironically stated by Józef Nowacki, “in the science of the 
law of the former Soviet Union, the three-part structure of the legal norm gained 
the most popularity and also was popularized in other socialist countries, and 
in Poland—mainly thanks to the Russian manual of the theory of state and law 
translated into Polish in 1951”39. The concept of a three-part structure of legal 
norm in the setting H®D/S, assumes that when there is a legally relevant situa-
tion, that is, when the circumstances described in the hypothesis are fulfilled, 
the addressee of the norm should behave according to the model of conduct 
formulated in the disposition. Depending on whether one adheres to the norm 
according to the recommended model, a sanction (positive or negative) will be 
employed. Legal norms that do not possess a sanction within their structure are 
defined as leges imperfectae (imperfect norms)40. Some of the authors in the Pol-
ish science of law, such as Henryk Rot, Stanisław Ehrlich and Jerzy Kowalski, 
when faced with the question of whether a legal norm is composed solely of two 
elements (hypothesis and disposition) and that when deprived of a  third ele-
ment (sanction) may be effectively predicated as a designate of the notion of legal 
norm, adopted an orthodox, negative attitude, stating that every constituent ele-
ment within the concept of the three-part structure of a  legal norm is a com-
pulsory element of every legal norm; consequently, they refused the attribute of 
38 The following based on MORAWSKI, Lech. Wstęp do  prawoznawstwa. Toruń: Dom 
Organizatora TNOIK, 1998, p. 58.
39 NOWACKI, Józef, TOBOR, Zygmunt. Wstęp do prawoznawstwa. Katowice: Naukowa Ofi-
cyna Wydawnicza, 1999, p. 67 and quoted titles. 
40 For more on the creation of imperfect norms, see: JABŁOŃSKA-BONCA, Jolanta. 
Przesłanki stanowienia norm bez sankcji. “Ruch Prawniczy Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 
(RPEiS) No. 4, 1984.
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legal norm all norms that were not composed of three elements: Hypothesis+
Disposition+Sanction41. Analysis of the content of legal norms indicates, how-
ever, that not all types of legal norms possess the third element (sanction), i.e., 
constitutional norms, and what is more, which will be discussed in more detail 
below, some norms of international public law are deprived of institutionalized 
sanctions, with no one (presently) questioning their legality. 
In the professional literature, we may encounter opinions that, in reference 
to leges imperfectae, talk about a  type of legal and factual possibility of “sana-
tion” or the completion of the lack of a sanction—appropriation of a sanction 
from other provisions that formulate the sanction—and perceived jointly, they 
create the content of the decoded legal norm. Thus, we agree with Stanley L. 
Paulson’s viewpoint, which claims that material norms are in a way secondary 
(as they are recreated from the content of the provisions of the law) and even if 
a singular provision does not have a sanction (for instance, a competence provi-
sion), in combination with other provisions that are decoded into a whole a legal 
norm will form and will be therefore completed by the sanction missing from 
the initial structure42. The lack of legal sanction, however, is not identical to 
a complete loss of control over addressees of imperfect norms but only of legal 
control, with social control maintained over the addressees by the impact of the 
dispersed sanctions foreseen in normative systems other than law. 
5 The Critical views on the concept of the three-part structure of a legal 
norm.
The concept of the three-part structure of a legal norm has been questioned 
by Jerzy Lande, who demonstrated that in order to formulate a complete legal 
norm, it is sufficient indeed, to include two elements—hypothesis and dispo-
sition—and that sanction is “a  separate norm […] that has in its hypothesis 
enumeration of infringement of another norm, and in its disposition—assign-
ment of the duty to the infringing subject, and of due entitlement to the second 
subject”43. 
The concept of the coupled norms is based on the assumption that every legal 
norm is composed of two norms: a sanctioned norm (H1®D) and a sanctioning 
norm (H2®S)44. What this means is that given the circumstances/situation of 
41 For more, see: ROT, Henryk. Kilka uwag o strukturze normy prawnej. „Państwo i Prawo” 
(PiP) 1957, Vol. 10, pp. 654, 655; EHRLICH, Stanisław. Przyczynek do problematyki normy 
i stosunku prawnego. „Państwo i Prawo” (PiP) 1956, Vol. 8–9, p. 389; KOWALSKI, Jerzy. 
Socjologiczny aspekt struktury normy prawnej. In EHRLICH, Stanisław (ed.). Studia z teorii 
prawa. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1965, p. 281. 
42 See: PAULSON, Stanley. An Empowerment Theory of Legal Norm. “Ratio Iuris” 1988/1, pp. 
58–70.
43 LANDE, Jerzy. Studia z  filozofii prawa. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Nau-
kowe,1959, p. 925.
44 It is important to point out the diversified terminology as far as the concept of conjugated 
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legal relevance as defined in the hypothesis of the sanctioned norm (H1), it is 
the addressee of that rule who should (as a duty) behave according to a model 
of conduct described/comprised in the disposition of the sanctioned norm, and 
when upon infringement or lack of accomplishing the disposition—again, as 
defined in the conditions of the hypothesis of the sanctioning norm (H2)—the 
sanction (S) as defined in the sanctioning norm will be conferred in an institu-
tionalized manner. Lande did not question the relationship between a legal norm 
and state constraint but stressed that sanctioned norms and sanctioning norms 
remain in relation through logical coupling, that is, that every sanctioned norm 
should have “its own” sanctioning norm. In conclusion, a rebours, it is impos-
sible to construct sanctioning norms from legal provisions without sanctions 
(leges imperfectae), only so-called sanctioned norms. Lande’s concept has been 
successively developed by Zygmunt Ziembiński, in whose opinion sanctioned 
and sanctioning norms remain in a  far looser relationship of functional cou-
pling45. The order to use constraint in case of infringement of a norm not only 
has to be expressed in that norm but it also is indispensable for the legal system 
to compose another norm encompassing such an order. A sanctioning norm in 
this approach is an auxiliary, hypothetical norm, activated only when the sanc-
tioned norm is being infringed. 
Other remarks or even reproaches were also formulated about the three-part 
structure of the legal norm. The first of the reproaches, made by Ryszard Sarko-
wicz and Jerzy Stelmach, concerns the semantic disorder among particular ele-
ments of the structure (H, D and S) of the legal norm within the concept in ques-
tion. The authors of the reproach consider that “while the hypothesis belongs to 
the normative discourse (the norm indicates due behaviour prescribed by the 
disposition for the sake of the circle of addressees defined by the hypothesis), the 
sanction is an informative sentence, stating the consequences of non-fulfilment 
of the conduct prescribed by the disposition. By accepting then such a model 
of the structure, we would need to accept a rather suspicious connection of ele-
ments of the directive and descriptive discourse”46. The next reproach they for-
mulated, conducted according to a reconstruction of the typical comprehension 
of an interpreter, goes as follows: if addressee A1 in situation B1 is supposed 
norms is concerned, such as: sanctioned and sanctioning norms (i.e., LANDE, Jerzy. Stu-
dia z filozofii prawa…, op.cit.,pp. 925–926); primal (basic) or material norms, and second-
ary norms or norms with a sanction (i.e., ROSS, Alf. On Law and Justice. London: Stevens 
& Sons Limited, 1958, p. 209).
45 “‘Legal norm’ should be composed of two functionally conjugated (not identical with logi-
cally conjugated) norms of conduct. (…) It is easy to notice that those two conjugated 
norms of conduct have distinctive addressees, distinctive circumstances of use and wholly 
distinctive range of use of the sanction”, ZIEMBIŃSKI, Zygmunt. Metodologiczne zagad-
nienia prawoznawstwa. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1974, p. 216. 
46 SARKOWICZ, Ryszard, STELAMCH, Jerzy. Teoria prawa. Monografie Wydziału Prawa 
i  Administracji Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego, 2001, p. 55.
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to behave in C1 manner, then addressee A2 (state organ) should behave with 
regard to A1 in C2 manner (sanction administrated to A1) and “demonstrates 
the incorrectness of a  three-part structure of the legal norm while simultane-
ously indicating the correctness of another comprehension of the structure of 
the legal norm”47 as two norms coupled together. 
Another author who questioned and rejected the three-part concept of legal 
norms as obsolete is Stanisław Kaźmierczyk, who also stated that in reference 
to certain types of legal norms, i.e., constitutional norms, the concept of cou-
pled norms turns out to be inadequate because formulation of the sanctioning 
norm in the form of an order imposed on a state organ and having as an object 
an authentic, institutionalized reaction (administration of the sanction) for 
infringement of the sanctioning norm by its addressee would lead to the neces-
sity to accept the conclusion contra legem that norms of the constitution are usu-
ally leges imperfectae.48
 Kaźmierczyk, in his analysis of the phenomenon of legal sanction (in a man-
ner distinctively different from the accepted and popularized theory of law to 
date), does not focus on the duty of the state organ to react to an infringement of 
the sanctioned norm, but clearly stresses the mandate of the organ to this reac-
tion, by stating that a sanction is among the competence norms, not among the 
substantive norms that impose the duty of execution of conferred competences, 
that is, to administrate the sanction49. Kaźmierczyk’s  viewpoint encountered 
a positive reception from Stanisław Czepita, who stated that “even though this 
approach drifts away from the present scheme of perception of the sanction-
ing norm, it is worth praise, since it takes into account a significant, and so far, 
neglected, intuition that says that we can talk about a sanction for infringement 
of norm N when a given subject carries the competence to react to the infringe-
ment of that norm and uses it, even without being forced to it by duty”50. 
The totality of the debate between the supporters of one concept or the other 
of the structure of a legal norm (that is, the three-part structure and the concept 
of coupled norms) and the role of the sanction, was the most accurately summed 
up and, in a way, concluded by Maria Borucka–Arctowa, who assessed that these 
concepts are not contradictory and that both constitute a rule for constructing 
legal norms from the provisions, which makes the choice of one of them neutral 
(she considers it to be a sort of convention) because, anyway, it doesn’t modify 
47 Ibidem, pp. 55–56.
48 CZEPITA, Stanisław. Konstytucja a teoria prawa. „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjo-
logiczny” (RPEiS), Year LXII, Vol. 2, 2000, p. 188.
49 KAŹMIERCZYK, Stanisław. Sankcja Konstytucji jako zagadnienie metodologiczne. In 
BATOR, ANDRZEJ (ed.). Z  zagadnień teorii i  filozofii prawa. Konstytucja. Wrocław: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego,1999, pp. 14–15.
50 CZEPITA, Stanisław. Konstytucja a teoria prawa…,op.cit., p. 188.
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the content of the law but only the systematization of the orders, interdictions, 
permissions, conditions to apply them and sanctions51. 
6 International law as lex imperfecta.
According to some authors, the fact that international public law, also known 
as law of nations, hasn’t developed a system of institutionalized sanctions ensur-
ing observance of its norms results from the fact that it constitutes in its totality 
quasi law, that is, a sensu stricto collection of norms of the type leges imperfectae. 
In Franiciszek Ryszka’s view, the mistake committed in the reflection on interna-
tional law and in its study is rooted in this statement: international law is still an 
imperfect law (lex imperfecta)52. The mistake committed the most frequently by 
lawyers not expert in international public law unjustifiably and incorrectly trans-
fer the apparatus of notions with precisely assigned significance straight from 
the theory of domestic (in this case, Polish) law into the sphere of research on 
public international law. International law is shaped as a decentralized structure, 
within which the question of the execution of behaviours complying with its 
principles and rules, including those concerning order and respect of values, but 
also self-defence, belong to the duties of the subjects of that law—members of 
international society; despite this decentralized character, international law has 
not been deprived of the attribute of law53. International law disposes of a series 
of sanctions that, even though plausible to use or enforce at any time, formally—
de iure—exist and potentially are able to influence the behaviour of particular 
members of the international community, do not always translate into reality. 
This potential, however, that is, the principle stating that states and other sub-
jects responsible for breaking international law must envisage, at least in theory, 
painful consequences, is one of the reasons for international law to be considered 
real law54. 
Amongst the norms of international law, we can encounter more and more 
frequently norms that nevertheless carry sanctions. This is a result of the modi-
fication that takes place in the characteristics of international law on two lev-
51 BORUCKA–ARCTOWA, Maria, WOLEŃSKI, Jan. Wstęp do  prawoznawstwa. Kraków: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1998, p. 79.
52 RYSZKA, Franciszek. Pamiętnik inteligenta: Dojrzewanie vol. 1. Warszawa: Polska Oficyna 
Wydawnicza “BGW”, 1994, p. 15.
53 As retaliatory means used in the guise of sanctions by international public law, we can indi-
cate, i.e., represalia. For more, see: SZWEDO, Piotr. Środki odwetowe w prawie Światowej 
Organizacji Handlu. Warszawa: Oficyna a Wolters Kluwer (a business), 2008, p. 19. See 
also RYSZKA, Joanna. Praktyka stosowania sankcji międzynarodowych w ramach ONZ. 
„Kwartalik Prawa Publicznego” rok V, nr 3/2005, pp. 9–40.
54 SIMMA, Bruno. Self-contained regimes. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 1985, 
No. 16, p. 135. See also SIMMA, Bruno, PULKOWSKI, Dirk. Of Planets and the Universe: 
Self-contained Regimes in International Law. “The European Journal of International 
Law” Vol. 17 no.3. EJIL 2006, pp.  483–529. [online]. Available at: http://www.ejil.org/
pdfs/17/3/202.pdf , Accessed: 08. 09. 2017.
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els—in the structure of the sources of law and in its goals and functions. In 
the first level, international public law is submitted to the process of constitu-
tionalisation (what can be described as the evolution from a multi-centric flat 
structure to a more protuberant form). In the second level, according to Lech 
Morawski, international public law heads towards a break, which he character-
izes as “Kant’s turn” and which can be simply described as passing in the domain 
of international law from the law of states to the law of states and nations—an 
understanding of international law in which the law is treated above all as an 
instrument of coordination of relations between states in the way bi- or multi-
lateral contracts that the states adhere to or not, instead of to a comprehension 
in which international law also becomes an instrument of protection of goods 
common to the entire international community. Perceived in this way, interna-
tional law regulates not only relations between states but also relations between 
states and citizens and their organisations”55. The admonished protection of the 
common goods of the international community, to a greater and greater extent, 
is carried out through making, applying and enforcing concentrated sanctions 
while also applying dispersed sanctions that don’t need to be applied directly in 
order to reach the intended result, as the very prospect of the sanctions happens 
to be sufficient (to various and, unfortunately, not always the adequate degree) in 
order to warn given actors of international law of unwanted behaviours from the 
point of view of the international community. In practice, the auxiliary aspect of 
sanctions finds its confirmation, as a sanction has not always been automatically 
and immediately applied in case of infringement of a legal duty, since launching 
a sanction may require a specific legal action on behalf of another entitled sub-
ject of international law. It is necessary, though, to notice that “in some cases, it is 
possible to find a sanctioning norm for infringement of a sanctioning norm, that 
is, a norm that orders to administer a sanction for non-administration of a sanc-
tion that should have been administered by state officials obliged to do so in case 
of a confirmation of infringement of a sanctioning norm. Eventually, however, 
the chain of following sanctioning norms accumulates in a norm, the infringe-
ment of which is only penalized by political or moral responsibility, not a legal 
sanction”56.
Conclusion.
To sum up, the effectiveness, efficiency and purposefulness of the law is not 
completely nor exclusively conditioned by the existence and type of legal con-
straint. Unfortunately, also today “the fact of the existence of sanctions as well 
as their great significance in the functioning of the systems of law make many 
theoreticians believe that constraint is a constitutive feature of the very notion of 
55 MORAWSKI, Lech. Suwerenność i  prawo międzynarodowe—od prawa państw do  prawa 
ludów. „Forum Prawnicze” No. 1 (3), 2011, pp. 13–14. 
56 REDELBACH, Andrzej, WRONKOWSKA, Sławomira, ZIEMBIŃSKI, Zygmunt. Zarys 
teorii państwa i prawa. op.cit., p. 91.
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the law. They, therefore, perceive constraint almost as the basis for the enforce-
ment of the law. Meanwhile, the social reality of the phenomenon of the force of 
law is quite different”57. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that an interesting type of legal sanc-
tion in the Polish legal order is positive sanctions. It is true that their role is not 
large in whole legal system but sometimes they are the more effectiveness factor 
of human motivation to legal behavior and more effectiveness factor of creating 
and protecting social and legal order than negative sanctions and legal procedure 
of punishment. For this reason, both the national legislator and the actors of 
the international community should all revise their own philosophy of shaping 
the national and supranational legal order. Negative sanctions are currently less 
effective and at the same time more and more expensive. Maybe the effectiveness 
and effectiveness of the legal protection of politically organized communities 
will depend on a change in the understanding of the role of law as a factor in 
bringing about social order and reconciling the particular conflicting interests 
of individuals by rewarding for the submission of the law. However, representa-
tives of the economic analysis of the law can rightly claim that prizes are de facto 
less expensive than penalties for both the legal system itself and the economy as 
a whole, especially on the supranation level.
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